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Abstract
It is impossible to set up standards of translation performance and equivalence which will
apply to any legal translation because the "languages of law" are as varied as the cases that
reach the courts every day. Moreover, the translation of legal texts is often complicated by the
lack of exact lexical equivalents in the TL’s own legal system so that a transfer involves a high
amount of "creative production". Obviously this production should be based on a profound
extra-linguistic knowledge of both legal systems involved to avoid the pitfalls which the
difference in conceptual meaning necessarily entails. Thus research into the TL’s substantive
law must be the first requirement in any legal translation context.
1. Introduction
The task of legal translation is often difficult because a particular legal
concept does not EXIST in the TL’s own legal system. Such situations call
for extreme caution in the transference of concepts and the translator will
often find it safer to explain his/her way out rather than concocting
something "elegant" for which the legal effect is doubtful.
In the process of producing equivalents or near-equivalents the translator
should seek to avoid reference to terms of art which have a unique conceptual
status in the TL’s substantive law and a choice of a "neutral" term is
preferable. This is the solution adopted in most international organizations
whose translators must constantly endeavour to avoid reference to unique
national concepts. (The problem is dealt with in more detail in  Section 4,
supra).
Apart from the extralinguistic knowledge the legal translator is also
required to have some knowledge of the most important "stylistic" features in
the TL to achieve formal equivalence. In the following some unique features
of English legal language are highlighted - all of which reoccur sufficently
"regularly" to satisfy the requirements of a specific "sublanguage" in the
English language (though a closer study will soon reveal that the stylistic
characteristics we normally ascribe to legal language are especially
predominant in only some of the areas).
The features1 are the same as were described more than a
decade ago, indeed some of the features have been the
same for centuries. The recent criticism of the English legal
language has, however, resulted in new drafting
recommendations within the profession itself and these
trends will be treated briefly in the closing part of this
article.
2. Man functions of legal language
It is obvious that the translator’s main concern should be
to establish the function which the particular translation is
to serve and subsequently adapt the stylistic devices to the
purpose.
In their analysis of the functions of legal language
Charrow/ Crandall/Charrow (1982) have given the main
factors contributing to the uniqueness of the legal varieties
and summarized them in "historical, political, sociological,
and jurisprudential factors".
The historical development accounts for the relics of
Latin and French in the vocabulary and also to some extent
for the "synonym habit" which was once a favourite in
English literature as well so that the legal "style" was really
a reflection of the fashion of a period rather than a unique
characteristic of its own.
As regards sociological factors the performative
("authoritative") function of the language instrument is
                                                
1 The characteristics and recommendations are an extract from a “Practical
Translation Guide for Language Students” which is in preparation as a by-product of the
writer’s main field of research, which is comparative commercial law (English/Danish
contract law).
one of the most important of all: In this function the
language carries the force of law, underlined by the use of
specific formulae, reminiscent of time-honoured rituals
which are inherent in the process of law. The ritualistic
aspect used to be
considered quite essential to "persuade" the public to obey
the laws of the land and deter them from breaking them
and to some extent legal proceedings are still dependent
on the observance of rituals, especially in the courtroom.
The ritualistic character of proceedings is emphasized in
the superior courts in England in Counsel’s wearing of wigs
and robes and the strict adherence to the procedural
restrictions regarding addresses in court:
"May it please your Lordship" (introducing Counsel’s respectful
"submissions" in a graceful way)
"All Rise"
“Your Honour"
"Will Counsel approach the Bench" (to emphasize the impartial
function of the judge)
"Swear the Witness"
"My learned colleague" (when Counsel address each other -
adding a touch of "congeniality" and mutual respect but it can
of course also be used ironically - which is often done)
The language functions here are obviously to stress the
solemnity of proceedings in the courtroom - the traditional
usage has a formalistic character deliberately linking the
proceedings to "antiquity" and are really "verbal
handshakes" hallowed by the passage of time. (Buckhaven,
Charlotte: Pleading for Learned Court Speak, NLJ, Aug.4
1989, at 868). As such they are hard to replace. Indeed
most critics of legal innuendo realize that this usage is
probably appropriate in the context it is used but the
continued use of robes and wigs has been under attack
recently. It is felt that the use of "unusual" dress
unnecessarily heightens the drama of a trial (which
lawyers no doubt enjoy) and that the barrister’s privilege
of wearing wigs should be broken.2
                                                
2 Traditional court dress is critizised e.g. in an article by Peter Reeves whose main
target is the criminal trial and the effect of the format dress on the evidence of witnesses. He
believes that it enhances the nervousness already present and may result in hesitancy and
Outside the court room the performative function is
undertaken in a slightly humbler way by lawyers acting for
their clients in a wide variety of functions, most often with
a view to convincing another party in an argumentation.
This faculty is considered the most important in the
training of law students and different styles are now
recommended so that lawyers may "tailor" their
communication (especially written) to the audience
envisaged:
2.1.  The audience in legal written discourse
Identifying the potential reader(s) of legal writings out of
the lawyer’s office is usually a simple task: He often writes
for an audience of "one " person only (another lawyer, a
judge, or a client) though the original addressee may
occasionnally be substituted in case of a dispute. A
contract e.g. will often be written for laymen (the parties to
it) but should be drafted with a wider audience in mind
because of the ever present risk of a dispute in the future
whereby third parties may be affected by the contract’s
terms.
Two important functions collide in the drafting process:
that of communication and that of "risk-minimizing": A
lawyer never knows WHICH of the clauses he has drafted
during a week will ultimately lead to dispute so all major
documents have to be drafted with the same amount of
care. This is one good reason why lawyers may fail to tailor
their writing to the audience and deliberately omit
"variety" of styles. Another good reason is the constant
                                                                                                                                                            
uncertainty wich may be falsely interpreted as an indication of unrealiability. (New Law
journal, Aug. 4 1989, p. 1004).
The modern attitude was tested in St Edmonsbury and Ipswich Diocesan Board of Finance v Clarke (1973) 3 WLR 1041: In this case the reasons for
wearing traditional court dress were analysed and it was said that robes and wigs “are convenient as an indication of the functions of those engaged in
proceedings and as enhancing the formality and dignity of grave occasion: In their appearance they also lessen differences of age, sex and clothing and so
aid concentration on the real issue without distraction...”
fear of the "clause-twisting" reader who reads merely with
a view to exploiting the provisions for his own purposes:
Most writers may reasonably expect their work to be read
in "good faith" - while most of lawyers’ writings are
potentially subject to a "hostile eye" - looking for loopholes
in a contract to escape liability for breach; imprecise
wording allowing room for ambiguities; gaps in a tabulated
description (so as NOT to cover the situation in hand);
striking down on minute shades of different semantic
content etc.
In the process of writing (and envisaging all these
potential risks!) the lawyer may easily give second priority
to his communicative function towards the immediate
audience, which is perhaps especially unfortunate in legal
"messages" of any kind:
"It is a sad fact that most of what lawyers write in their
professional capacity is read by people because they have
to, not because they want to", as one learned solicitor once
said.
The reader’s attention is consequently prone to wander
so that the message which was meant to be conveyed may
be lost in the process, if subdued by an over-zealous
application of "legalese". This is one of the most serious
charges against the "traditional" legal style of
communication.
A brief note may be given on the jurisprudential
factors of which the most important is considered to be the
traditional legal construction rules handed down in
common law3 which account for most of the "uniqeness"
                                                
3 The main common law construction rules are:
a) The “golden” rule: In construing all written instruments the grammatical and ordinary sense
of the word is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some “absurdity or inconsistency with
the rest of the document, in which case the sense may be modified so as to avoid that absurdity
and inconsistency (Lord Wensleydale in Grey v Pearson (1857) 6 HL Cas 61 at 106).
in the semantic area: Court decisions often result in
definitions of "common" words which are crucial in a
particular context. Sometimes the standard meaning of a
word may be "twisted" to fit the situation in hand and the
result is a standard legal definition which may deviate
slightly from ordinary usage. The same applies where a
draftsman defines a term for the parties to an agreement
but in contrast to the outcome of the draftman’s efforts in
a contractual setting which will in most circumstances
apply only inter partes4 a definition issued by a court will
be officially recognized and its use will tricker off defined
legal effects.
A factor any legal translator ignores at his/her peril.
3. Main identifiable characteristics of English
legal language
Most stylistic analyses have concentrated on the area of
"legal instruments", couched with a certain amount of
permanency and authority in view which may stand a test
in a court if necessary. The lawyer’s insistence on FORM
has always been most pronounced here which is easily
explained by the extreme practical importance attached to
these instruments and the legal effects produced by their
execution.
These extralinguistic factors should be borne in mind
when analysing the legal documents for "critical" purposes:
                                                                                                                                                            
b) The ejusdem generis rule: When giving an enumeration of specific items followed by
general words attention is focussed on the specific items to establish the genus class they
belong to. If such genus can be established the general words are read as confined to other
items of the same genus.
c) Expressio unius, exclusio alterius - also applying to enumerations: where specific words are
used, which are NOT followed by general words, only the items mentioned expressly are
deemed to be included.
4 Under the “privity of contract” principle which debars a third party from suing
under the contract.
No experienced lawyer would willingly risk concocting a
form of his own in view of the possible consequences to his
lay client:
The old traditional forms have already been tested and
clauses interpreted in cases so that reliance on an accepted
form is only natural from the point of minimising risks. It
is also expedient from the point of reducing costs because
it is speedier to provide a client with an off-the-shelf form
where every possible combination of circumstances and
every concievable misinterpretation that could be put to
the words is already envisaged and provided for.
The extralinguistic factors should also be taken into
account when translating the forms: It may expedient to
omit some of the features (especially visual and syntactic)
but it could be dangerous to "improve" the draftsman’s
style by cutting down "redundant" words.
Moreover, in most cases of repeated use the solicitor
has really no choice in the matter because a specific form
is compulsory to give efficacy to the disposition made (e.g.
in conveyancing). Also e.g. when filing claims on his
client’s behalf the use of specific forms is mandatory.
Accordingly, any "frozen-style" antagonist should
acknowledge these inbuilt hurdles to changes of style and
one understands the occasional annoyance within the
profession when such factors are conveniently left out of
consideration.
The "impartial" linguistic analyst could look for various
deviations5 from normal standard usage which directly
mark the texts as "legal variety" and will come up with
deviations on all levels: syntactic, lexical and lexical - most
of them emphasing the general impression of a "hyper-
formal", sometimes even frozen style.
3.1.  Visual markers
Earlier practice made use of graphological devices to
reveal general structure and main contents - necessitated
by the simple fact that the documents were written in one
compact mass, each line stretching from margin to margin.
This "one sentence" practice is rare today but can be met
occasionally in e.g. bonds and power of attorneys.
Modern documents make increasing use of
paragraphing, a practice first developed in statute drafting
from where it spread to business documents. The
arrangement usually follows a certain pattern: A number is
given to the clause and where more sentences comprise a
clause they are arranged in sub-clauses numbered (1) (2)
etc. Where further subdivision is necessary (a) (b) will be
introduced.
The practice is extremely convenient for translation as
well as a means of highlightening themes which are
presented in the SL in a "dense" form and need not be
transferred with that density.6
                                                
5 Most “markers” can be found in succession and land law which represent the
provinces of English law with the longest record of “unbroken continuity” which is often said
to be a characteristic of English law generally. Whereas commercial law, including contract
law, was influenced by continental concepts and ideologies at an early stage, land law has
been allowed to develop along its own “common law” lines for centuries. The situation is,
however, changing as a result og the UK’s EC membership which does not leave many areas
of law untouched and will no doubt eventually reach the couching of land documents as well.
6 Sometimes an ambiguity is planned by the draftsman to allow for “flexibility of
operation” and where such considerations have been at work the translator should probably
not interfere with the lay-out.
3.1.2. Capitalisation
Unlike the one-sentence habit the capitalisation device is
still widely used. Originally the use was partly for
"decoration" but modern use would seem to provide
distinctive visual emphasis only to important identifying
lexical items in the texts.
Both initial capitalisation and full capitalisation are
used - eg. in contracts of any type:
AN AGREEMENT made on...
BETWEEN  A.b. of [  ] (on the one part)
and
C.D. of ... [  ]  (of the other part)
IT IS AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
Items singled out for capitalisation include: the
document in hand (WILL, ASSIGNMENT; DEED,
MEMORANDUM etc); the parties; the operative words of the
instruments, signalling the introduction of the substance of
e.g. the agreement made; definitions of any description;
and specific institutions and bodies where the use does not
differ from ordinary usage.
This practice is very convenient for adopting in
translations into English - it makes for quick reference to
vital parts and would certainly be welcomed.
The use of capitalisation as "sequence markers"
(revealing logical progression) is rapidly declining except
for the "testimonium clause" at the end of documents for
which purpose the first two or three lexical items are
nearly always capitalised to signal "close" of instrument:
IN WITNESS (WHEREOF) ..the parties have hereunto set
their hands and seals the day and year first above written.
3.2.  Complexity elements
The complexity elements which have been emphasised by
most analysts in their descriptions of legal language are
still readily recognisable:
They relate to :
a) the sentence structure (extreme length with a large
number of subordinations and coordinations;
b) infinitive-splitting (which is a convenient legal device to
clarify meaning and as such of course perfectly
acceptable in a translation too;
c) "over-use" of adverbials and "unusual" positioning -
solely with a view to clarifying meaning;
d) absence of anaphora (which is also a means of achieving
precision. It is thought expedient to give the parties full
capacities under an agreement (as defined at the
outset) rather than risk the ambiguities of antecedence
a pronoun would give rise to);
Thus: "The Lessor shall whenever required by the
Lessee execute and the Lessee shall whenever required
by the Lessor without investigating the Lessors title
accept a Lease by deed of the premises to the Lessee"
(Lease Agreement)
If pronouns are used at all there is often a further
specification which removes any conceivable doubt as to
antecedence (e.g. as he, my said Attorney, shall find ...).
The rule is not without exceptions, however. In a case
from 1950 the following attestation clause was approved
by the court:
"Signed by the Testator in our presence and attested by us
in the presence of him and of each other" (In Re Selby-
Bigge [1950] 1 All ER 1009)
It is perhaps worth noting the judge’s (Hodson,J)
remarks in this connection: "In order to save the labour
and for the sake of neatness, every skillful practitioner
desires to reduce the number of words to the minimum".
The ruling does not seem to support the practioners’
fear of judicial disapproval when they are urged to cut
down some of the redundant legalese.
3.3.  Lexical markers
One immediately obvious characteristic is the highly
"nominal" style of most legal writings. It is indeed the most
striking feature in the variety at all and as such it has been
treated by analysts both within the profession itself (e.g.
Mellinkoff/1963) and by linguists.
Noun groups are not only dominant in terms of
quantity but also tend to be long and complicated
especially by contrast with verbal groups.
There is still a marked preference for postmodication
which contributes to the complexity especially where the
POM-element is expounded by an infinite clause or by
subordinate embeddings, involving "whiz-deletion", i.e. the
use of passives appearing in past participle phrases
e.g.
"the option to purchase hereby given"
"the policy hereby assigned"
"hereinafter referred to/called/described etc"
" the sum now paid"
(The effect, apart from added complexity, is of course
again a high amount of precision.)
The English legal vocabulary is characterized by
(Mellinkoff/ 1963/4-24):
a) Frequent use of common words with "uncommon"
meanings
Examples are almost too numerous to single out, e.g.
the word "avoid" meaning in a legal sense "invalidate" as
in "mistake avoids the contract in the following
circumstances....", i.e. "mistake operates to make the
contract void" in the following circumstances.
Or as it is used in the sale of goods law: "When a seller
has a voidable title to them but his title has not been
avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good
title provided..." (S. 23)7
b) Frequent use of Old and Middle English words once in
common use but now rare                                                                      
- e.g. all the "here" additions to prepositions: hereto,
heretobefore, herein, hereinbefore, hereinafter, hereunto
etc.
- e.g. as in the designation of parties to deeds or contracts:
"Between Mr. Barley (hereinafter called the vendor) of the
one part and Mrs Primrose (hereinafter called the
purchaser) of the other part it is hereby agreed:"
ALL lawyers are very partial to this usage and they are
extremely convenient in a translation context as well.
Contrary to most critics’ view they represent an economy
of expression!
"Whereas" is also an old English relic (used in recitals).
The semantic legalistic content is approximately "given the
fact that" - it does not convey "contrast" as in normal
English usage. This is a source of common
misunderstanding with translators who often use the
"whereas" device to introduce rights or obligations of the
second party after the enumeration of those of the first
party.
c) Frequent use of Latin words and phrases
- e.g. "in re, in personam, ex parte etc. and all the
equitable maxims which are still given in Latin, sometimes
with their English counterparts.
                                                
7 This means that an innocent purchaser for value will get a good title to stolen goods
or goods charged with an encumbrance - if he buys in a market overt. It represents one of the
exceptions to the common law rule of “nemo dat” in S. 2 of the same Act.
ex turpi causa" (non ovitur actio) - in "colloquial" legal
terminology "turpis causa"): a defence in contract and tort
which may bar a plaintiff’s claim if the harm suffered arose
while perpretating an "anti-social" act (e.g. barring a
burglar’s claim for damages when he has incompetently
overestimated the quantity of explosive needed to open a
safe!)8.
res ipsa (loquitur): a concept in tort whereby
"negligence" is found as a matter of inference
(presumption) from the very existence of a defect causing
an injury (product liability).
d) Use of old French and Anglo-Norman words which have
not been taken into the general vocabulary                                          
- e.g. devise (to "give" - when real property is involved in
e.g. a testamentary gift; tort (civil wrong) and all the
specific land law vocabulary relating to "estates" which is a
genuine relic of Norman property concepts.
e) Use of terms of art
These are technical words with a specific meaning
defined in law, e.g. injunction (judicial order to refrain
from doing an act); novation (substitution of a party for
one of the original parties to the contract); nuisance
(interference with someone’s enjoyment of his property)
etc.
                                                
8 Lord Asquith in NCB v England [1954] AC 403, 428.
f) Use of "argot"
In this sense argot represents a specialized vocabulary
common to the profession, untainted by negative
connotations, e.g. allege (maintain); without prejudice
(data which cannot be used in evidence unless by consent);
putative (reputed) connivance (knowledge that a wrong is
being done); Blackacre (or Whiteacre/Greenacre etc) to
denote a hypothetical piece of land for illustrative
purposes etc.
g) Frequent use of "formal" words
- eg. whereas, know all men by these presents; submit
(think, i.e. it is my opinion that... used in the courtroom
for at least one good reason: Counsel are not allowed to
proffer an opinion to the court - they can in fact only
"submit".
h) Deliberate use of words and expressions with "flexible"
meanings
e.g. adequate (consideration, compensation, cause etc.)
used e.g. in contract context in preference to sufficient to
avoid undue interference with parties’ intentions.
("Adequate" is to the legal mind a neutral concept).
gbh (grivous bodily harm) leaving it for the court to
decide what amounts to "serious" harm in a criminal
context.
reasonable (the yardstick in e.g. tort relations) etc.
i) Attempts at extreme precision of expression
- choice of absolutes: all, none, unavoidable, unbroken,
irrevocable, outright or the opposite: including, but not
limited to,... or other similar or dissimilar causes.
3.3.1. The Modern use of Latin
The law Latin9 used by modern lawyers differs somewhat
both in content and design from the Latin of medieval
texts. There is nothing "debased" or "corrupt" about the
modern use but the trend towards restricting the Latin
term for technical use - where an English and Latin term
compete in the description of a concept - has been
gradually enhanced.  Also it seems to be an increasingly
adopted practice to use the Latin term in the profession’s
internal communication (e.g. solicitor to barrister in the
briefs (instructions on a case) and vice versa) where the
term will denote a specific technicality, whereas the








cum testamento annexowith the will attached
pendente lite pending the lawsuit
sed quare enquire further
uberima fides absolute good faith
ultima ratio last resort
Other vestigial Latinisms:
The above Latinisms had simple English equivalents
with the same connotations but there are also a few
current terms and phrases which have no (adequate)
English equivalents. Some of these, however, have become
so commonplace and standard terms that their Latin origin
                                                
9 “law Latin” as a designation is not a term of art recognized by the profession - they
simply use the term to differentiate the Latin used in the law from other languages used in the
law and from Latin words outside the law. In this sense the Latin language is not “dead” and
the lawyers actually continue to develop its use.
is hardly noticeable, eg alibi, ex gratia, in camera,infra, in
re,inter alia,inter se, inter vivos,in toto, per se.
Others are pure terms of art: actus reus (the external
elements of a crime), amicus curiae (friend of the court -
assigned to help the court by expounding the law
impartially); animus donandi (intention to give) and all the
animus "siblings" describing intention to do something);
bona fide; donatio mortis causa (a transfer of property in
contemplation of the donor’s death); dum casta clause (so
long as the "recipient lives chaste" (eg in separation
agreements - an allowance only to be payable as long as
the wife lives "chaste". The term may still be met in
documents, notably wills).
When used as technicalities in a formal legal context,
e.g. in procedure, or for providing delicate "nuances" to a
legal text the persistent use of Latinisms is readily
understandable. The Latin terms are useful for the
description of concepts, which have a long record of
established definition behind them and their use allows for
quick communication. Also the failure of providing
adequate equivalents to important Latin concepts in such
fundamental areas as e.g tort law and land law accounts
for the continued dominating use here: It IS simpler to give
a tort as an injuria sine damno10 wrong or to state the
opposite in damno sine injuria11 terms than explaining
the concepts in "plain" (?) terms. There is always the risk
of ambiguity or misunderstandings if an equivalent is
used. Though it would seem that the two general defences,
volenti (in tort) and consent (criminal law) are very much
the same the latter has connotations which are not present
in the former, viz. deliberation - weighing of "good and
                                                
10 “Legal injury without harm” - tort principle according to which the actionability of
the wrong depends on the plaintiff’s establishment of an ascertainable loss (negligence).
11 Harm without legal injury. Where this tort principle is applied the injured party has
no right of action against the tortfeasor, e.g. because there was no legal duty to refrain from
causing the sort of harm involved (e.g. trade competition).
evil" etc . Thus, there is (nearly) almost a valid reason for
the use of the Latin term!
3.3.2. "The synonym habit"
The synonym habit in which legal draftsmen still excel had
its background in real necessity: With the Anglo-French
mixture of languages, coupled with the relics of Latin and
Old English a certain amount of double occurrence of the
same concepts seems quite unavoidable. How was the
draftsman to make a choice between terms which were
equaly valid and acceptable? How could he be sure they
were "equally valid" beyond reasonable doubt?
The uncertainty made lawyers reluctant to make a
choice between e.g. a French term (with an established
definition behind it) and an English equivalent of less
universal professional acceptance and would give each in a












Nor was the practice of multiplying words restricted to
legal language in medieval times. The habit is a
characteristic of most literary works of the time where it
was used for ornamental purposes (and with a view to
alliteration and rhytm) and it is certainly possible that the
same motives were present in legal writing.
Professional caution and "ornamental embellishment"
are not the only explanations, however. Emphasis and
precision considerations have also been at work to make a
point absolutely clear in a context where conflicting
concepts are often present at the same time.
(This does not explain why we still get strings of words
all denoting more or less the same thing eg: in lieu, in
place, instead and in substitution of... which can certainly
still be met in modern texts. The persistent use of such
strings is slightly baffling today when the English
equivalents have proved their efficacy).
Other examples include:
acknowledge and confess
annul and set aside
authorize and empower
covenant and agree








null and void and of no force
and effect
rest, residue and remainder
etc.
The habit of "word compilation"  which is related to the
synonym practice, and which still dominates modern legal
writing can best be explained on extra-linguistic grounds,
viz. the parol-evidence rule (or "four-corner" rule)
applying to interpretation in common law jurisdictions.12
A legal draftsman has to cover every conceivable
contingency in the document he is drafting because of this
stringent rule: Under English law a document (such as a
contract) "stands alone" in the interpretation process - the
judge is not allowed to take "extrinsic" evidence or data
into account when a contract clause comes up for scrutiny
in court. Accordingly the documents must be quite detailed
out of sheer necessity, giving specific references whenever
posssible rather than stating general principles which
might NOT cover the situation in hand.
The application is not restricted to contract and e.g. a
Will may say:
I authorize my Executors to buy, sell, assign, transfer,
convey, exchange, divide, invest, reinvest, pledge, mortgage,
borrow, lend, lease, release, deed, grant options,compromise,
arbitrate .... make contracts, deeds coneveyances, leases,
releases, transfers and other instruments in writing....etc,
all of which is stated to stress the unlimited scope of
discretion and exercise of the powers bestowed on the
                                                
12 Cf. e.g. Law Commission N_ 154, 1986.
executors. If the solicitor handling the drafting should omit
any of these specific references and a dispute arises
relating to a disposition made which is NOT expressly
stated a cumbersome and expensive litigation may result.
This risk is not lightly undertaken and would also be
imcompatible with the fiduciary relationship between
lawyer and client: The client obviously avails himself of the
services of the professional draftsman to avoid incurring
risks of litigation in the first place or alternatively, if such
litigation occurs despite the draftman’s efforts -to ensure
that adequate precautionary measures have been taken to
provide for this contingency as well.13
It is not a "myth" that unscrupulous litigants jump at
the chance of exploiting "gaps" in an enumeration such as
the above to seek invalidation of dispositions - as even a
cursory glance at any volume of law reports will
immediately reveal.
4. The translator’s choice
It is often a formidable task to choose among all these
stylistic devices when embarking upon a translation into
English legal language. The ultimate choice will always of
course be based on idiosyncracies (and as was stressed at
the outset: the FUNCTION of the text) and it is probably
not settled among translators yet whether we should
endeavour to transfer the elements at all!
In my own practice and as a consultant in English legal
language I have found some general trends which are
probably applicable to many Danish translators’ patterns
of performance:
                                                
13 It may be thought that “general clauses” could be used - but under English law a
general clause (e.g. to dispose of, assign, transfer etc.) would only confer such powers as are
needed to carry out the specifically conferred powers.
The translator rarely uses the delicate lexical devices
when translating into English (e.g. the Latin or French
terms) and thereby fails to exploit a convenient method of
variation and - as has been seen - precision - which we so
often seek to achieve in our end product. Perhaps the
reluctance is attributable to a fear of introducing "foreign"
elements which may not be readily understood (?) but that
fear at least could be overcome by the usual device of
adding an explanation.
Ultimately it is a matter of "taste" or intuition whether
the Latin/French is appropriate to retain from the source
text or introduce in the target text but as long as the habit
is favoured by the profession itself, it must "be deemed to
be" acceptable in a translation as well.
As regards the other characteristics on the lexical level
the source text’s own degree of formality as evidenced by
the occurrence of the characteristics just mentioned will
usually signal the target text’s level of formality as well:
The translator is not bound to "improve" the style but
should endeavour to transfer it "faithfully" and as
accurately as possible. In fact - in an "authorised"
translation we confirm in our attestation of the translated
text that that is exactly what we have done!
Usually the translator’s concern and difficulties are on
the conceptual level, however, and for a watertight result
there are no short cuts: Research into the target language’s
own legal concepts in the same fields must normally be
undertaken - at least when an area is approached for the
first time. The dictionaries (mono-lingual)14 may be
helpful here, combined with sets of forms and precedents
which are indispensable in the search for authentic terms.
                                                
14 As regards the bi-lingual dictionaries the market is short of titles of direct
application. Most do not contain exact definitions but they may function as stepping stones
for further study by introducing a concept treated in more detail in the mono-lingual
dictionaries.
Also "primary" sources such as case reports15 will
often be helpful in giving definitions for restricted
contexts.
Practical examples:
a) - where a direct equivalent is available:
In Danish contract context on breach the injured party
will naturally seek a remedy which will not only
compensate him for the loss incurred by the breach but
also for the profit he had expected to gain as a result of
entering the contract in the first place (his loss of bargain).
Danish law allows such performance expectations to be
fulfilled in the computation of damages by means of
"erstatning efter den positive opfyldelsesinteresse" which
we contrast with "erstatning efter kontraktsinteresse", a
remedy merely compensating the injured party for losses
incurred in preparing to perform - or simply restoring the
parties to their original positions.
The translator who needs to convey the impression of
complete performance inherent in "positiv
opfyldelsesinteresse" looks in vain in the bi-lingual
dictionaries which merely suggest "damages" to cover both
categories of remedy. A closer study of the English
damages concept, however, soon reveals that the English
system offers exactly the same remedies - at least relating
to the effect achieved: English law offers damages either on
an expectation basis (where the injured party is
compensated for both the loss sustained by the breach and
the profit he expected to gain by the bargain) or on a
reliance basis where the aim is exclusively to place the
plaintiff in his pre-contractual position .
Thus an "adequate" translation  should make the
distinction clear, thus:
                                                
15 All England Law Reports are the best sources here and - in the legislative field-
”Halsbury’s Statutes” could be consulted (for statutory definitions of terms).
"... parterne kan endvidere aftale, at ertatningsudmålingen ved
misligholdelse skal tilgodese den positive opfyldelsesinteresse"
(e.g. "... further the parties may agree that the measure of
damages on breach shall be on an expectation basis"
b) - no direct equivalent in target system
In Danish law we describe a common situation in a
contract context in which the promisor (offeror) in the
contractual setting is bound for a period and no similar
obligation attaches to the offeree as a "haltende
retsforhold".
In a translation into English it will be necessary to point
out where the inequality of burdens lies:
"Det hyppigste eksempel på et haltende retsforhold finder vi i
aftaleindgåelse, hvor det relaterer sig specifikt til
tilbudssituationen..."
- could be transferred as:
"The most common example of inequality of contractual
obligations relates to the formation of the contract, in particular
to the offeror’s position who will be bound for a period in which
the offeree is not similarly bound ...
Another example - from common law relates to the
concept of consideration: "Consideration" is a unique
common law concept modified to some extent by another
unique "equity" concept described as promissory estoppel.
In common law "consideration" is defined as the
"benefit accruing to one party or detriment sufferred by
the other“ (Lush J. in Currie v Misa (1875) LR 1o Ex 153
)16 and is traditionally regarded as the "bargain" element
which is essential in a synallagmatic contractual setting.
The same presuppostion exists in the Danish contract law
though not in express terms. Danish law will also
acknowledge that "something in return" for a promise
                                                
16 An alternative definition was given by Lord Dunedin in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co.
Ltd v Selfridge & Co. Ltd (1915) Ac 847 as “an act or forbearance of one party, or the
promise thereof is the price for which the promise is bought...” (at 855).
must be given to make that promise enforceable but this
view is based on a general doctrine of "equality of
positions " and "fairness" principles. These conceptual
differences should not complicate the translator’s task
unduly, however, as long as we can feel sure that the
fundamental ideas are the same we should feel free to
adopt them into the target text. One equivalent here might
be modydelse or vederlag (but contrary to some
dictionaries - it is NOT the same as
"vederlagsforudsætning" in Danish law - which is much
wider and a breach of which will give the injured party
specified remedies).
Promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine by which a
promisor may be estopped from going back on his promise
if certain specified requirements have been fulfilled. Again
no direct equivalent is available in the Danish system but
we share the fundamental view that a party should be
bound by a promise voluntarily given in exchange for a
counterpromise where the other party relies on it to his
detriment. Accordingly an explanatory translation such as
l¢ftebegrundet afskæring af kontraktsparts indsigelser
mod opfyldelse is at least acceptable and would convey the
idea tolerably.
Judicial officers and institutions
The translation of judicial officers and institutions
presents problems of a different kind than the substantive
law concepts. Most translators would choose not to
translate the various categories of law officers at all
because they are part of the cultural heritage unique to the
system in which they operate. It makes sense to avoid
comparing e.g. the Lord Chancellor to the Danish Minister
of Justice because their functions differ widely though they
are comparable on some heads. The safe procedure with
most law officers would be to retain the term in the TL
with a brief note of explanation as to status or main
function, adding an approximate "equivalent" if the
context so requires. If not, the introduction of the
"foreign" element could be quite natural in an exposition
on the legal system of the SL. The reader will  expect
elements which are not diretly applicable to his own
cultural (or professional) experience and references to a
"Registrar", "Magistrate", "Master" etc. are usually
immediately  comprehensible without more in the contexts
they appear.
At least retaining them is preferable to comparing them
to officers in the TL-system who would only from a
superficial point of view qualify as equivalents. Assuming
such parallels is really one of the most fatal mistakes the
translator may commit.
As regards the legal institutions they are more or less
on a level with proper names which is one good reason for
retaining the original term in the TL. Of course some of the
instituions are so often referred to in the sociolinguistic
context of the target language by their "offically"
translated names that the translator could use them as well
(e.g. the English High Court, which in its jurisdiction is so
close to the Danish landsret level that a direct comparison
is possible). It would not apply to the lower courts,
however, where the differences are so pronounced that the
translator conveys a wrong impression of similarity if the
original term (e.g. County Court) is not retained.
Example:
(from an exposition on Danish procedural law where the
explanatory note was designed to be "heavy" to avoid
ambiguities:
"Civilprocessen omfatter reglerne om behandlingen af borgerlige
sager ved de ordinære domstole (byret, landsret og h¢jesteret) så
som disse domstoles kompetence og organisation, hvem der kan
optræde som parter i retssager, parternes beføjelser og
rettergangsfuldmagt, hvilke tvister der kan bringes til 
afgørelse for domstolene, grundprincipperne for civilprocessen (forhandlingsmaksimen m.v) bevislæren, de nærmere regler om sagens 
"Civil procedure comprises the body of rules regulating civil
proceedings at the ordinary courts of law (i.e. courts of 1st
instance: "town courts"; superiour courts of mixed 1st instance
and appellate jurisdiction: "High Courts", and the supreme
appellate court in the Danish system "H¢jesteret" ("Supreme Court")
including i.a. the courts’ organisation and jurisdiction, the
procedural capacity of parties, remedies and powers of legal
repesentation in court proceedings, limitations regarding the
character of disputes which may be brought before the courts; the
fundamental principles in civil procedure (e.g. the doctrine of negotiation), evidence principles, particulars of the legal effects of the case 
An example such as the following - where the split-
infinitive is used may be "offensive" to a linguist(?) but
somehow those reservations will have to be overcome by
the translator, at least if the aim is to provide the form
familiar in the target language’s own system:
The contract, e.g. a lease may say in Danish:
"hvis lejer ikke rettidigt betaler afgifter, skatter eller
forsikringspræmier, kan ejer i hvert enkelt tilfælde kræve
lejeforholdet ophævet med seks måneders varsel eller straks
kræve det ophævet og lade lejer udsætte ..."
"Failure on the part of the tenant to punctually pay the rental,
taxes or insurance premiums shall entitle the landlord, in
each individual case, at his option, upon giving the tenant six
months’ notice, to terminate the lease or to terminate the lease
immediately and have the tenant evicted ..."
It may not be elegant - but we should probably be willing
to sacrifice elegance of expression for the sake of precision
-it will not be appreciated that a truly "sophisticated"
translation has been made if the meaning has been
tampered with to achieve the result!
5. Recent developments in drafting principles
Apart from keeping abreast of the development in
substantive law which has already been stressed as an
obvious requirement in any legal translation context, the
translator will also need to follow developments in current
drafting recommendations:
Changes in writing styles, such as they are
recommended in the profession itself and are likely to
manifest themselves in the SL texts should of course be
reflected in the translator’s products in the same language.
Most of the recommendations seem to be the results of
American influence but recently the pressure has started
to come from "within" in the UK as well, notably from the
pioneer work of Clarity17 and the Law Commission.
"Plain Language" Movement
                                                
17 A movement for the simplification of legal English whose efforts have been
noticeable in the late 80s and especially after Lord McKay’s appointment as Lord Chancellor
in 1988.
The origin of the criticism of legal writing style cannot
be pinpointed with any amount of absolute accuracy; it
seems to have been present both in the profession and out
of it for decades (at least). Indeed there is evidence as
early as 1551 when Boy King Edward VI expressed his
pious hope,
"I would wish that superfluos and tedious statutes were brought
into one sum together and made plain and short to the intent that
men might better understand them" (McBrien,J./1990). Or as
Jeremy Bentham put it in 1792: "The lies and nonsense the
law is stuffed with, forms so thick a mist, that a plain man,
nay, even a man of sense and learning, who is not in the trade can see neither through nor into it" (Truth v Ashhurst; 1792).
More examples can easily be found, in fact "defence
submissions" in respect of the traditional style are
considerably more difficult to come by!
It is reasonable, however, to trace the origin of the
current very profound critism to the 1970s in the general
wake of "consumerism", which brought about so many
fundamental changes in important areas of substantive
law. The frustration felt by "legally innocent" people when
trying to decipher their insurance policies and loan
agreeements to establish their rights and obligations under
them equalled the outrage felt by litigants who had to
surrender legitimate claims in the field of personal injury
compensation because they had "signed away" their rights
when accepting a standard contract, in which a crucial
liability exemption had escaped their attention.
The consumer area was thus the first field of law in
which "clarity" and comprehensibility of documentation
was most readily acknowledged. Since then, as is probably
well-known, several American states have introduced plain
language style in statute drafting in a large amount of
contract areas. Chief credit for the initiation of this
development is given to the Carter administration.
The drafting in plain English - outside the legislative
field - is now part of the compulsory training in American
law schools and the idea is slowly gaining acceptance in
the UK as well. The authorities responsible for solicitors’
training have been most responsive, whereas barristers are
still reluctant and tend to block the way for reform. The
attitude displayed by barristers is quite understandable,
they fight for their own privileges (like any profession
would do) which are enhanced by the retaining of the
familiar forms and the language barriers, enclosing the
barrister’s grounds like a fence excluding trespassers.
Also many solicitors share the "reverence" felt by the
profession generally for its common law institutions and
principles which applies to language habits as well, and to
many lawyers the growing tendency towards everyday
language in e.g. pleadings must seem quite offensive on
those grounds.
However, this "reverence" does not extend to accepting
the "verbosity", semantic "curlicues" and other
mannerisms as inevitable appendices to the job.Many
lawyers seem to be prepared to do without the redundant
legal phrases but will fight to keep what is "un-offensive"
in their style.
The offensive ear (or rather eye, as most of this goes for
writing only) referred to here and to whom a lawyer may
be willing to show "indulgence" is not that of the critical
linguist or colleague, but that of the CLIENT.18
                                                
18 The opposite view is also maintained in many practices: Some clients actually like
the old stock phrases and enter the lawyer’s office with deep-rooted preconceptions as to how
dealings will be conducted and instruments couched: They expect express provisions they
have seen “elsewhere” in instruments of the same kind and if their lawyer omits them the
omission may be ascribed to “ignorance” or “carelessness” both of wich are indeed serious
charges against any profession!
Also the “formal setting” - use of formal wording and time homoured rituals tends to
emphasize the serious character of the disposition about to be made which may make a client
more inclined to consider his moves carefully.
Solicitor v Client
The following are a few authentic examples provided by
clients who are critical of their lawyers’ persistent use of
legalese:
One Clarity member19 acting for a client had sent a
draft underlease to the solicitors for the prospective
tenant. One of the clauses provided that the tenant was to
pay for the cost of redecoration after moving out, if he left
the place in a shambles. Whilst agreeing in principle the
other side said in a letter they would like a proviso. "We
think it reasonable therefore, that the landlord’s surveyor
should attend fourteen days prior to the expiration of the
lease if so required and present his schedule fortwith"
The client’s solicitor saw no problem and drafted as
follows:
"...provided the Landlord’s Surveyor will on written request
prepare a Schedule of Dilapidations two weeks prior to the
expiration of the term"
When it came back from the tenant’s solicitors the
contents of the clause were hardly recognisable:
"...Provided Always as a condition precedent hereto that the
Landlord shall on the written request of the Tenant cause its
Surveyor or other proper Agent to attend at the demised
premises not less than one month prior to the end of the 
tenancy to examine the state and condition thereof and within
fourteen days thereafter to serve a Schedule upon the Tenant of
any defects and wants of repair and breaches of this subclause
there found and all works required by the Landlord to repair and
make good such defects and wants of repair and breaches of
covenants as aforesaid"  (It is hard not to agree with the client that 
this is "nut-cracking with a sledge-hammer")
                                                
19 One example among many - kindly provided by the Working Committee of Clarity
from their stock (1988).
Another example of "overlawyering" is provided by a
grant clause included in a licensing contract (US- style)
whose first version read:20
"Licensor hereby grants to Company the right to use Licensor’s
trademarks and or in connection with the advertisement,
distribution and sale of athletic shoes and athletic shoes
only."
This wording did not satisfy the client’s lawyer’s need
of precision and watertightness. This is how it came back:
"Use by Company of the Licensor trademark on products other
than athletic shoes shall result in immediate termination of this
agreement and the forfeiture by Company of its rights hereunder,
including the right to dispose of any inventory bearing Licensor’s
trademarks. Company agrees that Licensor shall have the right
to enforce this obligation by injunctiverelief and Company hereby
indemnifies Licensor for any and all costs, expenses, damages,
claims and expenses, including attorney’s fees, for any breach by
Company of the foregoing obligations".
As the client rightly points out - virtually nothing of
substance has been added to the first version. A party can
ALWAYS seek relief if the other party violates the contract
(It’s one of the reasons for making the contract in the first
place) Also, the basic points of law added are today
implied in a contract anyway.
What worries this particular client more, however, is
thefact that the tone of the argument has changed into
"confrontational drafting" - where each party seems to
expect the worst from their relationship! It may not be the
best starting point of a cooperative arrangement in which
the object is for BOTH SIDES to make money.
Quite a few business clients are very much aware of this
"side-effect" of "over-lawyering" in their business relations
and are instructing their legal advisers to frame documents
accordingly:
                                                
20 McCormack, M: What They Didn’t Teach Me at Yale law School, 1987.
5.1.  The impact of client pressure
In the face of vigorous criticism from especially business
clients who are working against the clock at all times and
find their burden of checking up on the legal adviser’s
work made harder than it needs to be it is becoming
increasingly difficult for the traditional style protagonists
to stand their ground.
The modern ideal drafting model taught to business law
students in particular, but applicable throughout the
profession) is - in simple terms: the draftsman should seek
to express the underlying intention of the document in as
short and "terse" language as possible while at the same
time retaining the formal framework which the document
is to constitute for the parties’ expressed intention.
The recommendations include i.a.:
a) Cutting down redundant words (as manifested in the
compound prepositions and stock phrases used for
decades) - on a line with the recommendations given
for business communication for years
b) Avoiding word-doubling and repetitions where they
don’t lend emphasis at all
c) Avoiding recitals (e.g. in contract models) and go
straight to the point (the substance of agreement or
"operative" part).
d) Restrict the use of strictly legal terms to clauses where
they are genuinely needed.
e) Be "brief", where possible.
The list is considerably longer and much has already
been said and predicted about the outcome of the "quest
for brevity" - most recently accentuated in the award of
the plain language movement’s trophey to the top judicial
officer in the UK - Lord Chancellor McKay of Clashfern for
his fight against incomprehensible statutes and forms. It
may also be noted in this context that the UK Civil Service
Minister has  urged his Department to reduce the legal
jargon whenever possible and get rid of incomprehensible
forms (NLJ/July 1990).
Thus it seems that the scales are against the old "legal
dinosaur" who may be forced eventually to open the gate
to the unwelcome intruders of modern language.
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